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This paper attempts to rethink the relationship between synergy and uncertainty from one 
where synergy increases as uncertainty decreases to one where synergy itself is an inherently 
uncertain phenomenon. It looks at how past attempts to reduce uncertainty has not led 
conclusively to a corresponding increase in synergy. It also presents the complexity science 
Synergetics as a promising new lens with which to develop a perspective of synergy as a 
process of self-organization that is inherently uncertain. The paper concludes with some 





The problem of uncertainty in realising synergy in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) has been 
a long standing one with Ansoff (1965) having recognised the need to account for uncertainty 
when he introduced synergy and Kay and Diamantopolous (1987) highlighting that as 
uncertainty increases the level of synergy decreases. Since then, research into M&A has tried 
to find ways to reduce the uncertainty around the realisation of synergies. Yet uncertainty still 
persists. Performance outcomes remain uncertain with some M&A producing positive 
synergy gains for shareholders (Barragota and Markelevich, 2008), others producing negative 
synergy outcomes (Aureli, 2015; Rao-Nicholson et al, 2016) and others still producing no 
impact whatsoever (Aik et al, 2015; Kumar, 2009). Forecasts of the future remain uncertain 
with a great many firms overestimating future synergies and, consequently, overpaying for 
targets (Fu, Lin and Officer, 2013). Finally, competitive responses have stayed uncertain with 
some M&A leading to reduced competition and profit gains for all (Chatterjee, 1986; 1992; 
Clougherty and Duso, 2011) and others leading to increased competition and reduced firm 
performance (Keil, Laamanen, and McGrath, 2013). 
 
All of this suggests that attempts to reduce uncertainty in order to enhance the chances of 
synergy realisation do not actually address the uncertainty of synergy in M&A. It also 
suggests that what may be needed is a fresh perspective that explicitly treats synergy as an 
inherently uncertain phenomenon. That is the purpose of this development paper which starts 
with the premise that synergy itself is an inherently uncertain phenomenon. The paper 
proceeds as follows. Firstly, it will examine more closely the inconclusiveness of attempts to 
reduce uncertainty in an effort to increase the chances of synergy. From there, a 
reconceptualisation of synergy as an inherently uncertain phenomenon will be suggested by 
highlighting the field of the complexity sciences known as Synergetics. Finally, the paper 




Mainstream Approaches to the Relationship Between Synergy and Uncertainty 
 
Uncertainty as Ambiguity 
 
One way they have tried to do this has been to diagnose the problem of uncertainty as one of 
ambiguity. Here, uncertainty is introduced by managers who do not fully understand the 
concept of synergy (Porter, 1985; Ansoff and McDonnell, 1990; Campbell and Luchs, 1998). 
Consequently, managers have either defined potential synergy opportunities too narrowly or 
too broadly (Ficery, Herd, and Pursche, 2007). Defining synergy opportunities too narrowly 
involves managers focussing solely upon the cost savings that are projected to arise from an 
acquisition (cost synergies) since they are easier to identify and to quantify in monetary 
terms. In so doing, managers neglect potentially more valuable revenue gains that could 
accrue from an acquisition (revenue synergies) since these are much more difficult to identify 
and quantify. Defining synergy opportunities too broadly involves seeing everything as a 
potential synergy opportunity which introduces the possibility of identifying a ‘synergy 
mirage’ (Campbell and Goold, 1998; Fiorentino and Garzello, 2015). This is where the 
synergies present in a given acquisition opportunity are overestimated while the costs of 
realising them are underestimated and it can lead acquirers to overpay for acquisition targets 
and then not realise the anticipated cost savings or revenue gains. 
 
Over the years, the response to this problem of ambiguity has been to identify various types 
of synergy as potential sources of cost and revenue synergies. The most common types 
identified have been: (1) the more efficient use of facilities (operating synergy) (Ansoff, 
1965; Lubatkin, 1983; Porter, 1985; Chatterjee, 1986; Goold and Campbell, 2000; 
Clougherty and Dusi, 2011); (2) investment savings from using common manufacturing 
plants, raw materials, and R&D facilities (investment or financial synergy) (Ansoff, 1965; 
Lubatkin, 1983; Chatterjee, 1986); (3) knowledge sharing (knowledge synergy) (Porter, 
1985; Goold and Campbell, 2000); (4) increased market power (collusive synergy) 
(Lubatkin, 1983; Chatterjee, 1986; Goold and Campbell, 2000; Clougherty and Duso, 
2011); and aligned strategies (strategy synergy) (Ansoff and McDonnell, 1990; Goold and 
Campbell, 2000). 
 
However, this increased clarity has not led to a corresponding increase in the ability of 
managers to accurately estimate the potential synergies of an impending acquisition. Recent 
research has shown that acquirers still overpay for targets on the basis of synergy estimations 
(Harford et al, 2012; Lin, Officer, and Zou, 2011; Fu, Lin and Officer, 2013). Moreover, 
research by Ismail (2011) and Di Guili (2013) has shown that, by paying for acquisitions with 
stocks and shares, acquiring managers demonstrate a lack of certainty regarding their own 
synergy estimates. Hence, reframing the problem of uncertainty as one of ambiguity has not 
provided a satisfactory solution. Yet, uncertainty is not only perceived as an ambiguity 
problem. 
 
Uncertainty as Information Asymmetry 
 
Another way in which the problem of uncertainty has been viewed is as an information 
problem. Here, attention is directed at the asymmetrical relationship in the information 
possessed by the parties involved in a merger or acquisition whereby one party has better 
information than the other (Yook, Gangopadhyay, and McCabe, 1999). In M&A research, 
this has referred predominantly to the asymmetry that exists between the acquiring firm and 
the target firm where those in the target firm have more accurate information about the firm’s 
actual value than the acquirer (Cuypers, Cuypers, and Martin, 2016; Goktan, 2012). This 
asymmetry becomes more acute when there is a physical distance between the acquiring firm 
and the target (Basu and Chevrier, 2011). It also introduces a number of uncertainties 
including uncertainty surrounding making an accurate estimation of the target firm on the 
part of the acquirer and uncertainty regarding how the returns will be divided between the 
acquirer and target (Goktan, 2012). 
 
The response to this problem has been to make the relationship more symmetrical by 
improving the quality of information that the acquirer possesses about the target by 
improving access to information. Two ways which are suggested are the use of toeholds and a 
focus upon local target. Toeholds are non-controlling stakes in a company often used as a 
precursor to an acquisition (often a hostile one). Such toeholds offer an opportunity for the 
potential acquirer to gain access to private information about the target rather than relying 
upon publicly available information (Povel and Sertsios, 2014). The focus on local targets is 
seen as a way of reducing physical distance between the acquirer and the target and therefore 
reducing information asymmetry by providing more opportunities for more private 
information exchange between the parties (Basu and Chevrier, 2011). 
 
Yet, much like the attempts to address uncertainty as a problem of ambiguity, these suggested 
solutions have not made valuations more certain or given more certainty to investors. For 
instance, the use of ‘toeholds’ have often not produced the anticipated returns from an 
acquisition (Ettinger, 2009) and, indeed, have introduced their own uncertainties such as the 
potential defensive response by the management of the target (Strickland, Martin and Cotter, 
2010). In addition, research by Kim and Chun (2016) has shown that, while physical distance 
does have a negative impact upon the returns from acquisitions, overcoming information 
asymmetry by focussing on local targets does not guarantee acquisition success. Thus treating 
the problem of uncertainty as one of information asymmetry has not made M&A more 
certain. Other researchers, however, have perceived the problem of uncertainty differently. 
 
Developing a view of synergy as an uncertain phenomenon 
 
The Promise of Synergetics 
 
One promising avenue for developing such a perspective comes from the complexity science 
known as Synergetics. Synergetics is a field of Complexity Theory which has transcended its 
origins in theoretical physics to become an interdisciplinary field investigating self- 
organization “from a unifying point of view” (Haken, 2004, p.v). In particular, it seeks to 
identify “common features of systems which acquire ordered states out of disordered states 
through the process of self-organization.” (Haken, 1985, p.205). This process describes how 
complex systems composed of individual elements and operating far-from-equilibrium can 
form structures spontaneously and naturally (Kauffman, 1995; Haken, 2004). In particular, 
the process of self-organization, unlike organization, does not rely upon external forces or 
agents to from structures but instead involves causal dynamics that “are “internal” to the parts 
(or participants) and their interactions” (Corning, 2003, p.287). As a result, systems, “acquire 
their order or structure without specific interference from the outside” (Haken, 1985, p.205) 
and in a way that cannot be determined by any of the agents in advance. Thus, by studying 
self-organisation as a process that produces inherently uncertain outcomes, Synergetics is, in 




The process proceeds as follows. Changes in ‘control parameters’ – external environment 
influences like the amount of energy flowing into a system – induce random fluctuations 
which, in a manner following the property of sensitive dependence on initial conditions, are 
then amplified exponentially to point where the system becomes unstable. At this instability 
point a dynamic of circular causality kicks in. On the one hand, joint actions – including 
competition and cooperation – between the parts produce patterns in the form of ‘order 
parameters’ which are parameters that describe the order of the system. In turn, these order 
parameters govern the behaviour of the parts via the slaving principle which reduces the 
amount of freedom the parts have (Haken, 1985; 2004; 2006; Haken et al, 1999; Portugali 
and Haken, 1992). 
 
The potential of this theory as a way of metaphorically reconceptualising the relationship 
between synergy and uncertainty is enhanced by the fact that Synergetics has implied that 
synergy is just such a process of self-organization. This is implied in the following quote by 
Haken (2004): 
 
“While I was starting from physics and was led into questions of 
chemistry and biology, quite recently colleagues of some other 
disciplines have drawn my attention to the fact that a conception, called 
synergy, has long been discussed in fields such as sociology…Here for 
instance the working together of different parts of the company, to 
improve the performance of the company, is studied. It thus appears that we are 
presently from two different sides digging a tunnel under a big mountain which 
has so far separated different disciplines, in particular the “soft” from the 
“hard” sciences.” (pp.352-3). 
 
This quote implies that synergy as a process of working together is, itself, a process of self- 
organization which produces structures spontaneously through the interaction of participants. 
As such, those structures are uncertain in advance. 
 
Further Development of the Paper 
 
The paper will be developed further in a number of ways: (1) by reviewing the different ways 
in which uncertainty has been conceptualised in management to show that mainstream 
attempts to reduce uncertainty in M&A research fail to tackle inherent uncertainty; (2) by 
incorporating a discussion of risk into the mainstream approaches to reducing synergy; (3) by 
imposing the constructs of Synergetics upon the classic case of the Royal Bank of Scotland’s 
takeover of NatWest to tease out an initial view of synergy as an inherent phenomenon; and 
(4) to discuss the implications of this initial view for the practice of pursuing synergy through 
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